: In Black's Law Dictionary - 6th Ed. - under "Government de facto" & "Government de jure", one can read of the some of the differences. Notably, the government de jure is the "government of right; the true and lawful government".
: What intrigues me, however, is found under the gvt. de facto: "A government actually exercising power and control, as opposed to the true and lawful government; a government not established according to the constitution of the nation, or not lawfully entitled to recognition or supremacy, but which has nevertheless supplanted or displaced the government de jure. A government deemed unlawful, or deemed wrongful or unjust, which, nevertheless, receives presently habitual obedience from the bulk of the community."
: "There are several degrees of what is called "de facto government". Such a government, in its highest degree, assumes a character very closely resembling that of a lawful government..."
: But *then*, one reads that:
: "The distinguishing characteristic of such a government is that adherents to it in war against the government de jure do not incur the penalties of treason; and, under certain limitations, obligations assumed by it in behalf of the country or otherwise will, in general, be respected by the government de jure when restored.
: "...when RESTORED."
: Question - Obviously, then, de jure governments have been restored in the past. Where? And more importantly - HOW??
: Ideas? Is the suit in Billings (Montana) related to this, Paul?
Courts created under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution are de jure, judicial power,
forums. These courts are known as
"district courts of the United States."
See, for example, 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(4)(B) --
the grant of original jurisdiction to
enforce requests submitted under the
Freedom of Information Act.
Courts created under Article IV of the
U.S. Constitution are also de jure, but
they are not vested with judicial power.
For authority, see C.J. Marshall's brilliant
exposition in American Insurance v. 356 Bales
of Cotton (cited correctly in Gilbertson's
OPENING BRIEF). These courts are known as
"United States district courts". Compare
all sections of 18 U.S.C. 1964, and see
the specific citations in "Karma and the
Federal Courts," in the Supreme Law Library
at this website (1964(a) and 1964(c),
The District Court of the United States
can only exercise judicial power when
competent and qualified judges preside.
In order to be qualified in the first
instance, such judges cannot be paying
taxes on their judicial compensation,
because Article III contains a specific
prohibition against such taxes, which
prohibition was upheld in Evans v. Gore.
You may refer to this prohibition as
an "immunity," but it is not an Immunity
as the latter term is used in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause,
because the latter only applies to
state Citizens (i.e. Citizens of ONE OF
the states United).
The holding in O'Malley v. Woodrough was
in error, for the reasons stated in
Gilbertson's OPENING BRIEF, thus
negating the implication that it overturned
the thorough holdings in Evans v. Gore.
See also Lord v. Kelley for proof that
the IRS exercises undue influence upon
federal judges who pay taxes on their pay.
Last but not least, 28 U.S.C. 132 attempted
to extend the United States District Court
into the territory that is within the
sovereign jurisdiction of the several states
of the Union. The ONLY way this extension
could be lawful, is by virtue of the Law
that the jurisdiction of all federal courts
is strictly dictated by federal statutes;
no statute -- no jurisdiction. Note,
in particular, that 28 U.S.C. 132 exists
in parallel with the statutes creating
District Courts of the United States
within each of the several states of the
Union (see all sections PRIOR TO 132).
Thus, relying on the unrebuttable findings
published in "Karma and the Federal Courts,"
18 U.S.C. 3231 does NOT grant any criminal
jurisdiction to the United States District
Court. It is ONLY the District Court of the
United States which has any original juris-
diction over criminal violations of Title
18 of the United States Code.
The exercise of judicial power, and the
exercise of quasi-judicial power within
the federal zone, can only occur if and when
a court has original jurisdiction. Moreover,
the jurisdiction of federal courts is never
presumed; it must be shown explicitly in
the pleadings brought by the Plaintiff.
Absent such proof, federal courts have
NO ORIGINAL JURISDICTION. Confer at
"Federal Courts" in C.J.S., for a succinct
discourse, with pertinent court authorities.
See also USA v. Knudson, in the case law
section of the Supreme Law Library, for a
clear, and technically precise, application
of this all important principle of federal
Now, with this foundation in mind, please
review all the pleadings which were filed
in People v. United States et al. This case
was brought to establish a "high ground,"
to which the Montana Freemen [sic] could
bring their grievances.
They chose NOT to do so.
LeRoy Michael Schweitzer did claim
sufficient knowledge of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure either to intervene
in that case, and/or to join the action
in some other capacity. He did not do so.
Templates for formally intervening were
prepared, as part of my professional
contribution to their defense.
Instead, Schweitzer and his associates
cooperated to deprive me of professional
compensation for 18 full days of double-time
I believe his entire theory falls under
the Law which holds that the Oath of Office
does not constitute a competent waiver of
the fundamental, "un-lien-able" Right to
remain silent in the face of a criminal
accusation. See Oath of Office provision
in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment,
the latter of which did not repeal the
former provision. Repeals by implication
are not favored, on authority of the
Ninth Circuit in USA v. Hicks [cite omitted].
There you have it, in a somewhat windy
but abbreviated summary.
/s/ Paul Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
Counselor at Law, Federal Witness
and Private Attorney General